Price Elasticity of Demand for Term Life Insurance and Adverse Selection by Mark V. Pauly et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
PRICE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND FOR TERM LIFE














This research was supported by grant R01 CA82393-01A1 from the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, National Institutes of Health.  Kate Withers contributed to the project while affiliated with the Wharton
School of Business at the University of Pennsylvania.  The views expressed herein are those of the authors and
not necessarily those of the Bank of America or the National Bureau of Economic Research.
©2003 by Mark V. Pauly, Kate H. Withers, Krupa Subramanian-Viswanathan, Jean Lemaire, John C.
Hershey, Katrina Armstrong, and David A. Asch.  All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is
given to the source.Price Elasticity of Demand for Term Life Insurance and Adverse Selection
Mark V. Pauly, Kate H. Withers, Krupa Subramanian-Viswanathan, Jean Lemaire, John C.
Hershey, Katrina Armstrong, and David A. Asch
NBER Working Paper No. 9925
August 2003
JEL No. D1, D8, D11, D12, D80, D82
ABSTRACT
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finds that the elasticity, in the range of -0.3 to -0.5, is sufficiently low that adverse selection in
term life insurance is unlikely to lead to a death spiral and may not even lead to measured effects
of adverse selection on total purchases.
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To many economic theorists, adverse selection seems a pervasive characteristic of insurance 
markets.  This position seems eminently reasonable.  Not only does it seem virtually certain that 
insurance buyers will have some information on the probability or amount of loss that insurers 
lack, but real world insurers seem obsessed by the thought that those who agree to buy from 
them must know something to make that purchase an unusually good deal. 
 
In the face of this theoretical and practitioner consensus, some recent high-quality empirical 
economic work is finding the opposite:  signs that, in both life and health insurance markets, 
there is no detectable adverse selection (Cawley and Philipson 1999; Cardon and Hendel 2001).  
 
While the authors of both articles interpret their results as evidence that, in some way, insurers 
must have found out everything insureds know, such a scenario seems implausible on its face.  In 
both settings, the key risk is limited to an individual’s health state, and that state is notoriously 
hard to measure objectively.  Witness the skimpy results after enormous effort to measure the 
quality of medical care by its outcome; external observers have a hard time knowing as much 
about a person’s body as the person does. 
 
However, even if buyers indeed know more than the sellers of insurance, serious adverse 
selection would not occur if those buyers were sluggish in their willingness to respond to that 
information.  Real consumers, after all, have more on their minds than paying attention to small 
bargains in insurance markets.  In short, low demand responsiveness to risk and premium   3
variation can also cause markets with truly asymmetric information to avoid the instability and 
bias associated with adverse selection. 
 
This responsiveness depends on two parameters:  the response of insurance demanders to 
changes in risk, given price (“risk elasticity”) and the response of insurance demanders to 
changes in price, given risk (“price elasticity”).  In the traditional Von Neumann-Morgenstern 
theory of choice under risk, the responsiveness (measured by elasticity) to the two influences 
should be approximately equal and large.  The demand for insurance should primarily depend on 
the relationship of premium to risk, usually summarized by the “loading” ratio.  The word 
“approximately” is included because the income effects of an increase in premium that changes 
the ratio by a given amount are opposite to those of a reduction in risk that produced the same 
effect. 
 
In this paper we estimate price and risk demand elasticities for 1year annually renewable term 
life insurance.  We then use these estimates to indicate how a hypothetical (but realistic) 
information asymmetry would affect this market.  Obviously, if information is sufficiently 
asymmetric, there can always be adverse selection even with very low price elasticity of demand, 
as long as the elasticity is not zero.  We therefore argue that, based on the range of plausible 
assumptions about variation in risk, information asymmetry would have to be very pronounced 
indeed for the insurance market to exhibit strong adverse selection effects; the likelihood of a 
“death spiral” is even lower. 
   4
Life Insurance Purchase and Adverse Selection 
 
One difficulty with using observations of existing practices in the life insurance industry to judge 
the chances of adverse selection is that those practices themselves are probably shaped by the 
concern buyers and sellers have for selection.  That is, both the market equilibrium that prevails 
and the institutional structures that support it are potentially endogenous.   
 
To be specific:  the best-known economic models of insurance markets with adverse selection 
assume that all insurers have costless and accurate information on the total quantity of insurance 
each purchaser buys (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976).  Then the instrument insurance firms use to 
induce lower risks to self-select is a so-called “price-quantity” policy, a combination of premium 
and the amount of coverage.  The institutional feature which permits insurers to have this kind of 
information is the Coordination of Benefits provision that exists for health insurance and some 
other types of insurance.  These provisions in principle give any insurer the power to determine 
the total amount of insurance a buyer has and/or to make payments of benefits dependent on 
truthful prior information about the total amount. 
 
Term life insurance, however, has no such provision.  While life insurers will sometimes inquire 
about how much coverage a prospective buyer already has, there is no mechanism for ensuring 
truthful revelation and, more to the point, no evidence that the premium for additional coverage 
is in any way affected by the amount of existing coverage.  If insurers thought themselves to be 
at substantial risk of adverse selection, they might price larger policies at higher unit costs.    5
However, as Philipson and Cawley point out, the typical-firm-level pricing policy for term life 
insurance exhibits quantity discounts:  unit prices which decline with quantity. 
 
Knowing the total amount of insurance a consumer has bought is important if there is moral 
hazard as well as adverse selection.  The absence of such provisions for term life is consistent 
with the conclusion that moral hazard is small and that adverse selection is small.  However, if 
observation of the total amount of coverage is itself especially costly, then the main Cawley-
Philipson result—that premiums from a given firm fall with quantity from that firm—is not 
sufficient to indicate there is no adverse selection.  As noted below, the decline in premiums with 
coverage could simply reflect the insurer’s administrative cost structure that includes a fixed cost 
per customer; the approximately constant-over-quantity marginal premium is what one would 
expect if customers could purchase from multiple sellers (so long as the fixed cost is moderate).  
No insurer that tried to charge increasing premiums with quantity would be able to sell large 
policies.  Moreover, insurers do increase their medical information requirements for applicants 
for applicants who apply for policies which are large relative to their “needs;” this may be a 
defense against adverse selection.  In a similar vein, both non-economic and economic (Gokhale 
and Kotlikoff 2002) planning models for life insurance purchase do not advise potential buyers 
to adjust their life insurance purchases if they face premiums which vary relative to mortality 
risk; instead people are advised to buy the insurance their dependents will “need” to replace lost 
income and maintain a level of consumption, regardless of the level of the premium or the 
person’s risk.  That is, buyers are not advised to engage in adverse selection, even when it would 
be to their private advantage to do so. 
   6
An Informal Model of Adverse Selection When Insurance Quantity Is Unknown 
 
We want to model insurance markets with potential adverse selection when insurance firms do 
not know the total quantity a given individual purchases. 
 
Let us therefore assume that insurers do not know the total (face) amount of life insurance any 
individual has purchased.  Next, let us assume that the annual premium P an insurer would 




where c is a fixed component of total firm revenue per policy sold, and b is a (constant) marginal 
price per unit of coverage.  There is a fixed component to the premium because there is a fixed 
component to the administrative cost; the cost of some of the administrative functions (like 
processing an application for coverage) does not vary with the amount of coverage purchased.  
The key assumption here is that b (and c, for that matter) depends only on the firm’s value of x, 
not on the total x the person buys from all sources.  Of course, once the marginal price is 
independent of x at any firm, then there is no strong incentive to the buyer to buy from more than 
one firm. 
 
Assume also that, initially, all buyers have the same level of risk, that they know the level of risk, 
and that they choose the amount of insurance to buy by maximizing a risk averse utility function, 
given the premium schedule (1).   7
 
What would then be the expected effect of private information for some or all buyers that 
indicates a change in loss probability from its initial (average) level?  If the premium schedule is 
unchanged, those who discover that they are high risks will optimally buy more coverage, and 
those who discover that they are lower risks will cut back.  How much either type of buyer will 
change depends on the risk elasticity of demand for insurance. 
 
As a result, the initial premium will no longer cover the firm’s benefit costs and administrative 
expenses.  As the insurer raises the marginal premium in the next period to cover the additional 
benefit costs incurred (now more heavily weighted by the higher risks and less heavily weighted 
by lower risks), all risks will reduce coverage as long as the price elasticity of demand is not 
zero.    
 
If the price elasticity of demand is uniform, regardless of risk, this reduction in coverage will 
take the form of an equi-proportional reduction, across all risk classes.  Then the process will 
achieve a new equilibrium at these smaller quantities.  There will be no cycle.  This result differs 
from the Rothschild-Stiglitz case.  No “death spiral” will have occurred.  To produce a death 
spiral, one would have to assume that the price elasticity of demand is less elastic  for higher 
risks than for lower risks.   
 
However, the net reduction in coverage from the initial no-information-asymmetry case provides 
a measure of the inefficiency associated with adverse selection.  If the reduction in coverage is 
relatively small in response to a price change, we can say that adverse selection is small.     8
 
Toward Empirical Analysis 
 
Somewhat surprisingly, while there have been many studies of the “determinants” of life 
insurance decisions, there have been few microeconomic studies of the effect of premiums or 
price on the demand for term life insurance.
3  Such an analysis would be more complex than the 
typical demand elasticity estimation for several reasons. 
 
First, the total premium for a policy obviously depends on the amount of coverage purchased: it 
represents total expenditure, or average price multiplied by quantity.  However as noted, 
premiums are not linear in coverage, so that the premium per dollar of coverage is not uniform 
over the amount of coverage.  Because the “fixed price” term c is positive, the average premium 
usually falls as coverage grows; the marginal premium may or may not be constant. 
 
There is a literature on behavior and empirical analysis of demand in situations where consumers 
face nonlinear price schedules (Hausman 1985; Hausman and Wise 1980; Nordin 1976).  The 
behavioral models are consistent with our earlier summary; the quantity demanded is determined 
by responding to the substitution effects from the marginal price and to the income effects 
associated with the fixed price component.   
 
Second, life insurance is typically sold in national markets, so that there is no obvious or 
identifiable source of substantial cross-sectional variation in marginal prices. However,   9
premiums do appear to vary across firms for what seems to be similar coverage. Premiums 
change over time, but much of this change is a response to changes in (perceived) mortality rates.  
The demand for insurance should depend not on the premium per se but on persons’ (perceived) 
mortality rate relative to the premium.  The primary source of price variation would then be 
variation in premiums not matched by variations in (perceived) risk.  Demand might also change 
if premiums and mortality rates experience equal proportional changes, because of lifetime 
income or wealth effects. 
 
Brown and Goolsbee (2002) have argued that the spread of the Internet lowered markups on 
average term insurance premiums, especially for younger buyers.
4  There may be some eventual 
hope of finding time series variation in marginal premiums, if either profitability or 
administrative costs change, but the detailed data on risk-adjusted premiums at the individual 
level has yet to become available. 
 
The price elasticity of demand for term life insurance is of more than casual interest.  Its value 
determines how total insurer revenues would be expected to respond to price changes.  For 
instance, if demand was greater than unit elastic, the price reduction found by Brown and 
Goolsbee would be associated with an increase in insurer revenues.  But those revenues would 
fall if demand (in the neighborhood of the current price) was relatively inelastic.  More relevant 
                                                                                                                                                                           
3 Babbel (1985) provides a time series study of the relationship between market-level price and the total amount of 
life insurance demanded in the United States.  Eisenhauer and Halek (1999) estimate a model of demand for term 
life which includes a “loading” variable, but they do not interpret it as the price. 
4 The subsequent increase in rates following insurance regulators’ allegations of under-reserving has not been 
investigated.  Presumably under-reserving was most severe for the types of people who use the Internet.  It may be 
good for price but not for quality.  If both change, the amount demanded could rise or fall depending on relative 
magnitudes.   10
for our purposes, the value of price elasticity determines how much information asymmetry will 
matter. 
 
A behavioral issue is whether an individual’s demand for insurance depends only on the ratio of 
premiums to expected benefits, the traditional “loading percentage”, which in turn implies that 
the demand elasticity with respect to premium, given risk, should equal the demand elasticity 
with respect to risk, given premium. This percentage plays the role of price in insurance theory 
(Ehrlich and Becker 1972), but actual behavior might be different.  For example, if doubling 
premiums (controlling for risk) has an effect on the amounts and types of insurance demanded, 
would we expect to observe the same or a similar effect if the mortality rate halved, holding the 
premium constant?   Both changes display the same change in the ratio of premiums to benefits. 
 
Another issue, which will be important for our empirical work, deals with consumer information.  
The premium a person pays is presumably known by that person; the premiums charged by other 
sellers may, however, only be known imperfectly.  An even more serious question concerns 
consumer perceptions of risk.  The right risk measure to use in the behavioral equation is what 
the consumer perceives to be the risk of death.  However, we only have information on the 
mortality rates calculated ex post, which might or might not be known to the consumer.  Take the 
case of a buyer who is a smoker.  The buyer knows that the premium he would have to pay is 
higher than if he were a non-smoker, but what would he assume about death probability?  Would 
he assume the same death probability as low risks, as the average risk, as the average risk for all 
smokers (regardless of the volume of smoking), or as the observed death rate for smokers 
smoking a certain number of cigarettes?  Or would he use the difference in premiums as a   11
measure of the difference in risk (Kunreuther and Pauly, 2003). In our analysis we will explore 
the effect of using a number of measures of relative risk..   
 
Demand Estimation in the Presence of Quantity Discounts 
 
If adverse selection were a serious problem in life insurance markets, if insurers could observe 
the total quantity of life insurance purchased at the individual level, and if the administrative cost 
per unit of insurance were constant over units, conventional microeconomic theory would predict 
that in a competitive equilibrium (if it exists) unit prices would be increasing in the face amount 
of coverage (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976).  However, empirical evidence from the life insurance 
market suggests that the unit premium for term insurance declines as the face amount of 
coverage increases (Cawley and Philipson 1999); these discounts exist both because average 
administrative and selling costs fall as a buyer purchases a larger policy, and because sellers of 
insurance are unable to observe the total amount of insurance bought from all sellers. Of course, 
with average costs falling with quantity, adverse selection would be consistent with unit 
premiums that decline with quantity as long as the decline is less steep than that of costs. 
 
One key question is whether the alleged failure of life insurers to pay attention to insurance 
purchased from other sellers is due to a high cost of monitoring insurance quantity or whether it 
is due to the fact that there is so little information asymmetry about actual risk that knowledge of 
the total quantity would not be helpful.  The answer is probably some of both.  Compared to 
health insurance, say, or even property-casualty insurance, there is no observable benchmark of 
loss or cost to which life insurance quantities could be compared.  Someone who bought health   12
insurance that paid out more than his medical bills, or homeowners insurance that paid more than 
the damage done by a fire would be an obvious candidate as someone with inside knowledge 
about risk (not to mention strong incentives for moral hazard before the fact).  But there is no 
objective loss measure associated with premature mortality, and so more difficulty in identifying 
the high risk by noting “excess” insurance purchases.  However, it is also true (according to 
Cawley and Philipson) that the simple correlation between the amount of insurance purchased 
and (actual) mortality is inverse, perhaps reflecting other influences on the demand for life 
insurance that are inversely correlated with mortality (such as income) but also perhaps 
indicating that buyers do not know more than sellers.  Moreover, life insurers do sometimes have 
stricter underwriting standards for people applying for large amounts of term life insurance; 
variation in standards with quantity might substitute for variation in unit premiums with quantity. 
 
Due to the presence of quantity discounts, each consumer in the life insurance market faces a 
downward sloping rather than horizontal supply curve (Cawley and Philipson 1999) at what 
might be called the “intensive” margin.   In this situation, the observed unit or average price and 
quantity are simultaneously determined by the consumer’s demand.  This phenomenon adds to 
the challenge to estimating the price elasticity of demand for term life insurance using consumer-
level microeconomic data. 
 
In order to generate an unbiased measure of price elasticity, the price used should be exogenous 
to the consumer demand framework. There are two reasons why observed prices will not be 
exogenous. First, estimating the consumer demand equation using an ex-post unit price paid 
(calculated from purchase data) will obviously yield a biased price elasticity estimate due to the   13
endogeneity of price in the consumer demand system.  However, if the actual price schedules 
that individuals with a given set of risk characteristics face in the market vary exogenously in a 
way that can be observed by the econometrician (from offered price schedules), then the 
marginal price for each risk group can be obtained either directly from the tariff data or by 
estimating an industry-level pricing equation using firm-level offered premiums as the dependent 
variable in the regression.
5  But if price schedules do not vary much across observations (because 
all buyers are purchasing in the same competitive market), or if the prices people find are 
correlated with demand (for example, because people with stronger demands search more 
extensively for low prices), elasticity estimates will still be potentially biased.  The best solution 
would be to find exogenous price measures that vary across risk groups.  (This is the strategy we 
follow below.)  Alternatively an instrumental variables approach could be used to control for the 
endogeneity of ex-post prices in the consumer demand equation.  Good price instruments, 
however, are hard to find. 
 
The presence of bulk discounts in the life insurance market introduces non-convexities into the 
consumer’s budget constraint.  This creates the possibility that there will be multiple tangencies 
between the consumer’s indifference curves and budget constraint set (Taylor 1975; Hausman 
1985).  In order to uniquely identify parameters in the consumer demand function, two price 
variables should be included in the demand equation: the marginal price, which captures the 
price effect on quantity demanded given that a positive quantity of insurance is purchased; and 
the “fixed cost” to the consumer of  the opportunity to purchase insurance beyond the minimum 
                                                      
5 It is reasonable to assume that term insurance premiums in the United States are set in a national market, and that 
there is one industry supply curve (Brown and Goolsbee 2002).  The group specific marginal price for term 
insurance is equal to the regression coefficient on the face amount of coverage in a linear pricing equation with a 
constant term, and is by definition exogenous to the consumer demand system.  We ignore possible simultaneity   14
quantity at a given marginal price (Nordin 1976).  The impact of this fixed cost on the size of 
policy demanded should primarily be that of an income effect, but it may also serve as indicator 
of self-selection into the sample of buyers.  That is, people who buy insurance only at a low fixed 
price may have lower demands for insurance (on average) than those still willing to buy some 
insurance even though the fixed price is high.  In principle, then, the coefficient on the fixed cost 
could be positive, suggesting a censoring of observations, or negative, suggesting income effects 
in quantity demanded. 
 
Price Measure  
 
There are econometric and theoretical justifications for using exogenous measures of marginal 
price in order to capture how consumers change coverage when the prevailing premiums change.  
If one wants to recover the parameters in the consumer demand system, it is necessary to control 
for the two-part pricing of term insurance contracts.  We control for the fixed cost to the 
consumer of being able to purchase life insurance at the offered marginal premium by including 
the fixed cost in the demand equation (see Taylor 1975; Dubin 1985).  As noted above, any 
effect of the fixed cost  will capture the “income effect” on purchasing (for those who demand 
positive amounts of insurance), while the marginal price measure captures the “price effect” on 
term insurance demand (Dubin 1985).   
 
Secondly, if a competitive insurer’s expected payouts rise because the probability of survival 
falls, its premiums will also rise.  However, almost all of this increase should affect the marginal 
                                                                                                                                                                           
between premium and quantity in the pricing equation, which would arise if insurers set premiums to induce a given 
level of demand.   15
price rather than the fixed price, since variations in the mortality rate should not affect the fixed 
costs of selling insurance.  We assume that this property holds both for changes in survival 
probability, given age, over different years and for changes in survival probability for individuals 
of different ages at a given point in time. In short, the elasticity parameter that we care about in a 
life insurance market is the elasticity of demand with respect to the marginal premium rather 
than the total or average premium. 
 
The other characteristic of a price measure is that it should vary to some extent across otherwise 
identical buyers.  The problem here is that term life insurance at any point in time is generally 
sold in a national market. While posted or quoted prices may vary across firms, there is no 
obvious reason why buyers with the same set of risk characteristics cannot all have access to the 
same set of prices, and would therefore all choose the same (lowest) price.  If they do not do so, 
we do not know why. 
 
The absence of a clear source of exogenous variation in prices is an issue in generating unbiased 
estimates of price elasticity.  For example, suppose one plausibly assumes that a demander who 
would buy more insurance at a given (marginal) price would search more intensively for a low 
price than a person with a smaller demand.  On average, those with stronger demands will then 
be paying lower prices, but the price measure will be inversely correlated with unobserved terms 
in the demand equation.  More generally, in the empirical estimates which follow, we pay 
attention to possible exogenous causes for variation in prices.  We try to find “market-level” 
price measures as well as “individual-level” measures. 
   16
Data Sources 
 
We do not know exactly which prices consumers were facing and which risk measures they were 
using to guide their insurance purchasing decisions.  Accordingly we experiment with a variety 
of specifications using different measures of each. 
 
We use two industry data sources to estimate the price elasticity of demand for term insurance.  
The first is a monthly dataset sold by CompuLife that contains firm-level premium data for term 
life insurance contracts of 17 different sizes from all major companies in the US market in every 
state.  The CompuLife datasets are used by life insurance agents to compare premium offerings 
across companies, and are generally thought to contain accurate premium information.  In the 
CompuLife datasets, premium offerings are broken down by the risk characteristics of the 
insured persons, including their age, sex, smoking status and health status. 
 
The presence of multiple insurers raises the questions of what quantity premium schedule to use.  
Should it be that of a single “typical” insurer, or should it be a composite of those of all insurers 
offering contracts to a given risk group?  A buyer who selects a firm making the best offer for 
one quantity of insurance is not obliged to use that firm for other quantities.  Also, not all 
insurers offer contracts of all sizes to a given risk group, so buying from the same firm may not 
be an option. 
 
We use two alternative estimates of “market” price schedules to test the robustness  of our 
estimates.  In one, we use the premium of the median firm in each demographic cell-quality   17
combination.  In the other, we use, as data for the premium regression, the premiums posted by 
all firms weighted by the number of offers in a given policy size category.  These weights, which 
sum to 1 for each policy size, are necessary because the number of offers vary significantly 
across the 17 different policy sizes in the CompuLife dataset.   
 
We first use the January 1997 CompuLife dataset to estimate term insurance pricing regressions 
for 1-year level term contracts for the median firm in the market as of January 1997 for each risk 
class separately.  We use two statistical methods to estimate a linear pricing equation for the term 
insurance industry.  Insurance premiums vary across states, but only to a very modest extent.  
We therefore look at premiums offered by the median firm in the largest state (California) to 30, 
40, 50 & 60 year olds for all 48 possible combinations of the sex, smoking and health status 
categories.  We interpolate the estimated marginal prices and fixed costs by single year of age for 
all the relevant risk groups to reflect the pricing gradient by age controlling for all other risk 
factors. There are 48 separate pricing regressions, each with 17 different values for the quantity 
of coverage.  We then use the average and marginal prices estimates  from these regressions as 
explanatory variables to explain the variations in the amounts of coverage purchased by 
consumers in another data set, from  LIMRA International.  The second specification for the 
pricing regression makes use of premium offerings from all firms (weighted by the number of 
policy size offers in a given contract size class) in the California market to estimate a similar 
pricing equation which is used in a similar way.
6  Using the marginal price and fixed cost 
estimates from the two general techniques described above, we therefore estimated demand 
                                                      
6 We considered estimating the pricing equation with firm-level fixed effects.  However, that technique would be 
relevant only if consumers typically chose a firm in advance and considered only its price schedule for different 
amounts of coverage.  However, it is surely possible that a firm with the lowest price for, say, $50,000 of coverage   18
regressions using (as the “exogenous” premium) the estimated marginal premium per $1000 
coverage.  This “market” premium varies across risk groups, not individuals, and is independent 
of the quantity of term insurance purchased, thereby reducing concerns about endogeneity bias.  
 
To explore the effect of possible variation in premiums across persons, we used a second type of 
measure: a person-specific marginal premium.  This measure of premium is constructed from the 
premium reported in the same LIMRA data used for the total quantity of coverage purchased. 
We estimate a person-specific marginal premium by subtracting the class-average fixed cost 
from the CompuLife pricing regressions from the annual premium the person paid for the life 
insurance contract, and then dividing that number by the quantity of coverage purchased. Exactly 
why different individuals would pay different premiums for the same coverage is unclear; it 
might be related to consumer search behavior.  If so, the price paid is to some extent endogenous, 
so these results should be interpreted with caution; we should expect these measured elasticities 
to be higher in absolute value than in the first case.  We also use another person-specific 
premium: the ratio of annual premium paid (for the quantity purchased) divided by the predicted 
premium based on the person’s fixed cost and marginal price coefficients from the CompuLife 
pricing regressions.    
 
Consumer-level data on the quantity of new term life insurance purchased is taken from the 1997 
US Buyer’s Study sold by LIMRA International.  The 1997 LIMRA Buyer’s study consists of a 
random sample of policies bought by customers in a given year by over 35 life insurance 
companies comprising approximately half of the life insurance market in terms of number of 
                                                                                                                                                                           
might not be the lowest price if the person wanted to buy $500,000 of coverage.  Thus, the within-firm marginal 
price would not represent the price schedule a consumer faces.   19
policies sold (LIMRA 1998).  We analyze data from the 1997 LIMRA Buyer’s study since it is 
the most recent dataset available for purchase.  The term life insurance market has undergone 
significant changes in market structure during the 1990s associated with market entry and the 
introduction of on-line search engines for term insurance (Brown and Goolsbee 2002).  Because 
the increase in market competition in the 1990s may have caused a structural change in the price 
elasticity parameter, we focus our analysis on the most recent year available.
7   
 
The LIMRA data also contains information on the attributes of the life insurance contracts sold 
and the basic demographic characteristics of the buyers.
  The data include information on the 
amount of coverage purchased, the annual premiums paid, the amount of existing life insurance 
coverage in force, the term lengths of the contracts, riders attached to the policies, the annual 
premium, the month and year of purchase, and basic demographic information on insured 
persons, including: age, sex, income, occupation, marital status, and receipt of a non-smoking 
discount.  Individual company identifiers were masked. Weights are provided to make the 
sample representative of the policies sold at the contributing firm level. 
 
Some of the key factors that are known to influence life insurance demand (but usually not 
premiums)—like self-evaluated current health status, number of children, income and wealth—
are either completely missing, or are not available for a large number of observations in the 
LIMRA data. (For example, even family income data is missing for about a third of the 
observations.)  We report regression results using the large LIMRA sample in which individual 
observations are augmented by median household income by zip code from the 1990 US Census.  
                                                      
7 In separate analyses not reported here we estimate the price elasticity of demand for term insurance using the 1993 
and 1995 LIMRA Buyer’s datasets, and find that there has been an increase in the price elasticity of demand during   20
Although additional socio-demographic controls are available at the zip code level from the 1990 
census, we do not include these controls due to concerns about measurement error. 
 
While using Maximum Likelihood estimation with an error components error structure will 
enable us to control from biases arising from sample truncation inherent to using purchase data 
to model consumer demand, we are nevertheless without information on what determines 




The mortality risk measure used in the demand regressions is the national average annual 
probability of dying during the period of coverage for all individuals with a given set of age, sex, 
health status, and (in some cases) smoking characteristics.  This measure was calculated using 
mortality data from the 1997 U.S. Life Tables published by the National Center for Health 
Statistics (see Anderson 1999, and National Center for Health Statistics 1997 & 1998).  Sex-age-
specific mortality data on the number of survivors at various years of age in 1997 were used to 
estimate the percent of people that will die during the period of term life insurance coverage 
based on the age of the insured person at the beginning and end of term insurance coverage.  The 
mortality risk variable included in the regressions is the natural log of this annual mortality risk 
estimate, which varies across individuals.  Using data on the relative risk of dying (over a one-
year period) between smokers and non-smokers across various age intervals published in Rogers 
and Powell-Griner (1991), and data on smoking prevalence by age group from the Centers for 
                                                                                                                                                                           
the decade of the 1990s (LIMRA 1996; LIMRA 1994).   21
Disease Control and Prevention (1998), we adjust the mortality risk for smoking status.
8  The 
smoking status adjustments were necessarily imperfect, so we show results with and without this 
imperfect adjustment.  
 
CompuLife Pricing Regressions 
 
We use the CompuLife dataset to estimate industry-level pricing regressions for 1-year annually 
renewable level term contracts for the median firm in the market as of January 1997.  We first 
define risk groups based on the age, sex, smoking and health status of the buyers.  Companies 
with all ratings are used in the analyses.  In 1997, the CompuLife data require that we view 
premium and contract offerings by state.  Based on conversations with life insurers, we assume 
that median premiums are unlikely to vary significantly across states (with the exception of New 
York, where state withholding regulations affect premiums).
9  We also expect variation in the 
degree of market competition—and hence premiums—to be minimal across states (Brown and 
Goolsbee 2002).  
  
We limit our sample to 1-year annually renewable term contracts priced for 30, 40, 50, and 60-
year old males and females for all possible combinations of the smoking and health status 
categories.  Separate pricing regressions are estimated for each risk group.  We priced contracts 
                                                      
8 The adjustment assumes that the relative death risk between smokers and non-smokers is equal to the 1 year 
relative death risk published in Rogers and Powell-Griner (1991).  In order to obtain the 1 year death risk measure 
for smokers, we use a weighted average of the light and heavy smoker death rates published in Rogers and Powell-
Griner (1991).  We assume that for all age groups 83 percent of smokers are light smokers and 17 percent of 
smokers are heavy smokers (American Lung Association, 2002).  The adjustment may introduce measurement error 
into the smoking-adjusted mortality estimate since the adjustment for smoking requires that we use  smoking 
prevalence estimates that are aggregated by 5-year age intervals and approximations for the distribution of light and 
heavy smokers in the smoking population. The key question, of course, is what different buyers perceive to be their 
risk.   22
for 17 different policy sizes among firms offering life insurance contracts in California in 1997.
10  
The premium regression equation estimated is then:  
 
(2)   Offered Premium=aj+PjQ +ε        
 
where Q is the term insurance face amount for individuals in risk group j in January 1997.  Then 
aj is the estimated fixed cost for each risk class and Pj is the estimated marginal price.  As 
mentioned above, we estimate pricing equation (2) using two different sample—premium 
offerings from the median firm in the market (Tables 1a and 1b), and premium offerings from all 
firms in the market pooled and weighted (Tables 2a and 2b).  We then interpolate fixed costs and 
marginal premiums by single year of age to more accurately reflect the age pricing gradient for 
each risk group.   
 
Separate pricing regressions are estimated for each risk group.  Tables 1a and 1b show the 
estimated marginal premiums from the different pricing specifications we tried using the 
CompuLife data.
11  The pricing equation approximates the actual tariff schedule that individuals 
of a given risk class face in the market for the “median” firm in the market.  The R
2 for most of 
these pricing regressions is close to unity, which indicates that a linear pricing schedule above a 
fixed cost fits the data well. Table 1b shows marginal premium estimates when we include all 
premium offerings in the market.    
                                                                                                                                                                           
9 Telephone conversation with Bob Barney, President of CompuLife, March 2002. 
10 We price level term insurance policies for the following face amounts: $50 K, $100 K, $150 K, $200 K, $250 K, 
$300 K, $350 K, $400 K, $500 K, $750 K, $1 million, $2 million, $3 million, $5 million, $10 million. $15 million & 
$25 million. 
11  The marginal price estimates are the regression estimates multiplied by 1,000, or the marginal price per $1,000 of 
coverage.   23
 
Estimated marginal prices always decline with improved health status holding other risk factors 
constant.  Marginal prices at any age are higher for males than for females, as well as for 
smokers than for non-smokers. Marginal prices also increase with age holding all other risk 
factors constant. There is not a large difference between the “preferred” and “preferred-plus” 
health categories.  We tested whether marginal prices varied over units, and could not reject the 
hypothesis of constancy.
12   
 
Tables 2a and 2b show the estimated fixed cost (or the “average premium” component of the 
premium per policy) for all risk groups using the two different specifications for the CompuLife 
life insurance pricing equation.  These fixed cost estimates are the intercept terms of the 
estimated Compulife regression equations and are used to calculate the value of the marginal 
premium that varies across individuals rather than risk groups after interpolating for single year 
of age.  Differences in the estimated intercept term across groups reflects differences in costs 
(associated with medical underwriting, etc.) inherent to selling any coverage to individuals in a 
given risk category.  These estimates are generally in the range of $40-$70 per contract.  (By 
way of illustration, a fixed component of $70 would amount to 31% of the annual premium for 
$100 thousand of coverage for a non-smoking 40-year-old male.)  The estimates for ages 50 and 
60 vary a great deal, but relatively few new term policies are sold at this age. (A negative fixed 
price would, however, imply the existence of adverse selection).   
 
Estimation of Demand Elasticities    24
 
We focus our analysis on the purchase of 1-year annually renewable level term contracts, or the 




The LIMRA Buyer’s data is not a random sample.  Rather sample selection occurs on the basis 
of whether or not a contract is purchased.  Accordingly, a truncated regression model is used to 
estimate the price elasticity of demand. 
 
The smallest contract size sold in 1997 is $2,500.  We do not observe the purchase of any life 
insurance contracts with a face amount less than $2,500 because smaller life insurance policies 
are not sold by insurers.  Data on non-purchasers for whom Qi=$0 is not observed.  Hence the 
selection equation for the LIMRA data, which defines the subset of the population included in 
the sample, is: 
 
(3) Si=1[$2,500 < Qi < ∞ ]  
 
where Si=1 if individual i is included in the sample, and Si=0 when individual i is excluded from 
the sample.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
12 Cawley and Philipson (1999) also report that conversations with life insurers suggest that insurers rely upon a 
linear rather than non-linear incremental pricing schedule to price term insurance contracts, and their own regression 
results from this data show insignificant quadratic terms.   25
The selection rule allows us to characterize the subset of the population excluded from the 
LIMRA sample.  Although we cannot use the price elasticity coefficients based on a sample of 
life insurance purchasers to infer the price elasticity of non-purchasers, the price elasticity of 
demand conditional on having decided to purchase a life insurance contract is still of interest 
because it measures the price sensitivity of purchases on the intensive margin.   
 
In order to obtain consistent and efficient estimates of the parameters in the conditional 
consumer demand equation will need to specify the conditional distribution of Qi given Xi and Si 
and use maximum likelihood estimation. We assume that the conditional distribution is normal 
with mean Xβ  and variance σ
2, where X is a matrix of control variables that enter the consumer 
demand equation. The relevant estimation technique is the truncated normal regression model 




We limit the sample to include adults who bought level term contracts with no rider or a level 
term rider on their own lives.  We exclude contracts that are part of an employee benefit plan, 
that are not owned by the insured person, or that contain missing data on the smoking status of 
the insured.  We exclude military sales and sales by home service companies. 
 
Price Measures   
   26
We report regression results using three price definitions.  The first price definition uses the 
estimated CompuLife marginal price for the person’s risk group interpolated for single year of 
age as the exogenous price measure in the consumer demand equation.  This price is the fitted 
coefficient Pj from equation (1) for individuals that belong to risk group j.  Implicitly, the 
assumption is that this “average marginal” price for the person’s risk group is independent of the 
other terms (“tastes”) in that individual’s demand function. The LIMRA data do not contain 
information the health characteristics of the buyers even though life insurers are known to 
condition their premium offerings on health status indicators.  We therefore use the mid-point 
between the CompuLife regular and preferred-plus marginal and average prices for each risk 
group as the relevant price measure for individuals in the LIMRA sample. We assume that the 
insurer does know smoking status of the insured. 
 
The regression also controls for the (observed) mortality rate in the person’s risk group.  Thus, 
over all observations, it is presumably variation in the relationship between marginal prices and 
risk across risk cells that generate variation in the net cost of insurance.  For example, if two cells 
have the same mortality rate, but different marginal premiums, we would expect to see different 
amounts of insurance demanded.  The Brown-Goolsbee results on the effect of the Internet 
would suggest, for example, that this price measure should be lower for Web-using younger 
people.   
 
The second price definition uses an individual-level marginal premium as the exogenous price 
measure.  We calculate the person specific marginal price by using the average price estimate by 
risk group (interpolated by single year of age) from the CompuLife pricing regressions, and data   27
on total premium paid and face amount of life insurance coverage purchased from the LIMRA 






where aj is the estimated constant term in the CompuLife pricing regression for risk group j (see 
equation 2).  Unlike the CompuLife marginal prices, Pi
* varies across individuals.  
 
The third price definition uses a relative premium measure which varies across individuals.  This 
relative premium measure is the ratio of total premium paid divided by predicted CompuLife 
premium.  The predicted Compulife premium for each individual is: 
 
(5)  Predicted Premiumi=aj+Pj*Qi 
 
where aj and Pj are the estimated coefficients from the CompuLife pricing equation (2) 
interpolated by single year of age.  We include the log of the ratio of the annual premium paid to 
the predicted premium based on the CompuLife coefficient estimates as exogenous price variable 





                                                      
13 A fourth price expression would estimate the marginal price direct from the LIMRA data.  The problem here is 
that the price paid is endogenous in the consumer demand system.  Preliminary estimates of demand equations based 
on such a measure gave implausible positive price elasticities.   28







δ exp(ε i)    
 
where Qi is the face amount of term life insurance purchased, C is a constant term, P is one of the 
marginal premium measures, FCi is the estimated fixed cost, Ri is the individual mortality risk 
variable, and Zi are demographic controls that affect life insurance demand, including income, 
age, sex and marital status.  The regression equation has a log-linear form, since some of the 
controls included in the Zi matrix are binary variables.   
 
Taking logs, we estimate the following empirical demand equation using Maximum Likelihood: 
 
(7) lnQi=φ +β lnP+ψ lnFCi+γ lnRi +δ Zi + ε i    
 
where the marginal price measure (P) is the CompuLife marginal price (Pj), the person-specific 
marginal price (Pi
*), or a relative price, which is the annual premium paid divided by the 
predicted premium given the quantity purchased and using the fixed and marginal price 
coefficients from the CompuLife regression to predict the premium.  The dependent variable is 
the log of the total coverage purchased.  
 
Results 
   29
Tables 3 and 4 show the estimated demand regressions using the marginal premiums calculated 
from the CompuLife data for the median-premium insurer in each cell.  In both cases the 
estimated price elasticity is approximately -0.5; the estimated risk elasticity has a positive and 
statistically significant elasticity in the range from 0.16 to 0.29.  The fixed cost component of the 
premium is positive but not statistically significant. Other significant variables include median 
income by zipcode, with an expected positive sign, female sex with an expected negative sign, 
and significantly higher demand in New England relative to the Midwest.  The quarterly 
dummies are not statistically significant, which suggests that life insurance demand is not 
seasonal. 
 
Table 5 shows the price and risk elasticities for several other different specifications of the price 
variable and of the data set used to estimate the price variable.  The estimated values of the price 
elasticities vary little; price elasticity generally varies between -0.41 and -0.58.  The risk 
elasticities tend to be higher when the all-firm estimate of marginal price is used; in some 
specifications they are also in the neighborhood of 0.5. When the relative premium is used as a 
measure of price, the smoking-adjusted risk elasticity is either statistically insignificant or 
negative in sign. In the majority of cases, however, the risk elasticity has a point estimate which 
is positive but is lower (in absolute value) than that of the premium “price” elasticity.  The 
elasticities tend to be approximately the same in the market-price and individual-price 
specification, suggesting no endogeneity bias. 
 
An analysis of the goodness-of-fit statistics suggests that the fit is better when risk is adjusted for 
smoking for the specifications using the CompuLife or individual marginal premia.  When the   30
relative premium is used, the fit is worse with smoking adjusted risk.  However, the relative 
premium measure itself does not provide as good a fit as do the other two price measures.  In 
addition, the relative premium measure is likely to be partly endogenous because it is calculated 
from the actual premium paid. 
 
To sum up:  the price (or marginal) premium elasticity of demand is estimated to be in the range 
of -0.31 to -0.58; this finding is robust with regard to measures of marginal price in the demand 
system.  The elasticity of coverage with respect to mortality risk is generally positive and 
statistically significant, but ranges in value from 0.2 to 0.5.  The coefficient on mortality risk is 
usually smaller than the coefficient on marginal premium, suggesting that proportional loading 
does not entirely determine quantity demanded. These results indicate that people do pay 
attention to premiums they face and their own risk of needing benefits; the “needs” model 
favored by insurance advisors is strongly rejected.  However, although people do respond to 




These results suggest that the elasticity of demand for 1-year level term life insurance contracts 
is about -0.4 to -0.5. It is more price sensitive than the insurance “needs” models would assume, 
but is still only moderately responsive.  Demand is usually less sensitive to risk than to premiums 
although the risk term is usually positive and statistically significant.   
   31
If there is asymmetric information, the interpretation of this result depends on the extent and 
importance of that information.  If the portion of the population receiving information about 
large differences in death risk probabilities is substantial, adverse selection can occur even with a 
low price elasticity.  However, these results are consistent with the view that life insurance 
markets can remain reasonably stable even with information asymmetry on individual mortality 
risk (when the variation in information is also modest, insurers are unable to observe the total 
amount of insurance purchased). 
 
Another finding is even more important for the model (but somewhat less reliable in the 
empirical estimation method).  For the process of adverse selection even to begin as a result of 
information asymmetry, consumers must start the process by choosing substantially different 
amounts of insurance when their perceived risks are altered by information. The usually lower 
risk elasticity implies that the first step in the process, a response in terms of desired insurance 
quantity to changes in risk with premiums held constant, may be small.  
 
Our results suggest that life insurance purchasers engage in behavior (or, more accurately, non-
behavior) which greatly mitigates the effect of asymmetric information about individual risk 
between insured and insurer in term life insurance markets.  It would, of course, still be possible 
for asymmetric information that secretly and substantially changed loss probabilities for a large 
portion of the population to cause adverse selection.  But as long as any substantial information 
asymmetry is concentrated in a small population share, and as long as any large group’s 
information asymmetry is small, adverse selection will not occur. 
   32
Whether these elasticities are “small enough” to avoid symptoms of adverse selection depends 
on what we assume about the extent of information asymmetry.  Chronic conditions generally 
affect only about 15 percent of persons aged 45 (in the midpoint of the data), but most chronic 
conditions are detectable.  More plausibly, people may have some idea of how they feel 
physically, but the information content of differences in this information is likely to be low. 
 
For example, suppose 5 percent of buyers have information that suggests that their mortality rate 
is three times greater than the standard (200% greater). (This is the magnitude of the impact of a 
positive genetic test for the breast cancer gene on female survival (Subramanian et al, 1999).) If 
they respond to this information with an elasticity of 0.4 (and other buyers respond to the 
absence of information that they are high risks), the overall risk level per dollar of purchased 
coverage will rise by only 8.6 percent.  The subsequent reduction in insurance purchases by 
lower risks would be only 3.4 percent (using the same elasticity).  Moreover, as noted above the 
high risks will also reduce their insurance purchases so that there may be only weak subsequent 
adjustments.  This is not enough of a response to provoke a death spiral or even a large reduction 
in coverage. 
 
One might suppose that the result that small amounts of special information for many or large 
amounts of special information concentrated only on a few does not distort the market is close to 
the Cawley and Philipson conclusion of no adverse selection.  Had demand or risk elasticity been 
substantially greater (even in the “small difference” or “small numbers” cases), the conventional 
models could lead to a prediction of serious problems.  Our results suggest that this case does not 
arise.  Adverse selection behavior may fail to be manifested not because sellers know as much as   33
buyers, but rather because buyers have more important things to care about than reacting to 
asymmetric information in life insurance markets. 
   34
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Table 3.  Demand Regressions, Marginal Premium Estimated from Median Firm Data.  1-Year 
Level Term Contracts in 1997. 
   Estimate  StdErr  DF  tValue  Probt 
Intercept  7.401 0.753  1429 9.823 0.000 
Log of CompuLife Marginal Premium per $1000 Coverage  -0.538 0.085  1429  -6.343 0.000 
Log of (Unadjusted) Death Probability  0.287 0.087  1429 3.280 0.001 
Log of Fixed Price  0.136 0.079  1429 1.719 0.086 
Log of 1990 Median Income by Zip-Code  0.612 0.054  1429  11.310 0.000 
Quarter 1  0.033 0.055  1429 0.604 0.546 
Quarter 2  0.025 0.057  1429 0.436 0.663 
Quarter 3  0.091 0.058  1429 1.572 0.116 
Quarter 4  0.000             
Married  0.104 0.063  1429 1.646 0.100 
Single  -0.237 0.092  1429  -2.593 0.010 
Widowed/Divorced  0.000             
No Previous Coverage  -0.066 0.045  1429  -1.464 0.143 
Previous Coverage  0.000             
Female  -0.483 0.045  1429  -10.756 0.000 
Male  0.000             
Additional Coverage  0.174 0.240  1429 0.725 0.468 
Region: Mid-West  -0.167 0.066  1429  -2.509 0.012 
Region: New England  -0.085 0.065  1429  -1.313 0.190 
Region: South  -0.117 0.066  1429  -1.783 0.075 
Region: West  0.000             
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Table 5 
Marginal Price Variable  Price Elasticity  Risk Elasticity 
(Unadjusted) 
Risk Elasticity  
(Adjusted for 
Smoking) 
Using Median Firm Data      
-0.477 0.328    Individual Marginal 
Premium  -0.473   0.200 
-0.458 -0.020*    Relative Premium 
-0.434   -0.110 
Using Weighted All-Firm 
Data 
    
-0.408 0.468    CompuLife Premium 
-0.578   0.382 
-0.405 0.495    Individual Marginal 
Premium  -0.422   0.311 
-0.467 0.334    Relative Premium 
-0.446   0.071 
All variables statistically significant unless indicated 
*Not statistically significant 
 